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Abstract 
 
When two individuals alternate reaching responses to targets located in a visual 
display, reaction times are longer when responses are directed to where the co-
actor just responded. Although an abundance of work has examined the many 
characteristics of this phenomenon it is not yet known why the effect occurs. Some 
authors have argued that action representation mechanisms are central to the 
effect. However, here we present evidence in support of an account in which the 
representation of action is not necessary. First, the basic effect occurs even when 
participants cannot see their co-actor’s movement but, importantly, have their 
attention shifted to a target side via an attentional cue. Second, its time course is 
too short-lasting to function effectively as a component of action planning. Finally, 
unlike other joint action phenomena, the effect is not modulated by higher-order 
mechanisms concerned with the personal attributes of a co-actor. Taken together, 
these results suggest that this particular joint action phenomenon is due to 
attentional rather than action mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: social IOR, action representation, selective attention, joint Simon 
effect. 
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Introduction 
The dominant paradigm in cognitive research is the testing of individuals on 
tasks performed in isolation. In the archetypal experiment a lone individual 
performs a required task in front of a computerized display, from which the 
experimenter can examine aspects of the individual’s perceptual, attentional, 
memory, or executive abilities. However, during the past decade a number of 
researchers have begun to examine how cognition operates when a person acts 
jointly with another individual. One finding is that the presence of others can 
influence how attention is selectively allocated across a visual display (Böckler, 
Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2012; Frischen, Loach & Tipper, 2009; Tversky & Hard, 2009). 
For example, when participants are asked to respond to a target, whilst ignoring 
simultaneously appearing distractors, their egocentric frame of reference can shift 
to an allocentric one if the task is performed jointly with another individual 
(Frischen et al., 2009).   
       Joint action work is often placed within the context of theories that link 
mechanisms representing perception and action, one of which being the theory of 
event coding (TEC; Hommel, Musseler, Ascherschleben & Prinz, 2001). In essence, 
the TEC suggests that perceived events (perception) and intended to-be-executed 
events (action) share a common representational domain. As such, irrespective of 
their role, both stimulus and response codes are formed and represented in the 
same medium as cognitive structures, called ‘event codes’.  Event codes are said 
to prime each other in accordance to an overlap on an abstract distal-coding level, 
implying these are formed on the basis of goal-directed representations of the 
events. ‘According to TEC, intentionality renders perception and action-planning 
inherently similar and functionally equivalent’ (Hommel et al., 2001, p. 904). Thus, 
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anticipating a perceptual event, perceiving it, planning the event or executing it 
are assumed to result in a similar activation in the motor system.  
     The theory has been used as an explanation for one of the most notable 
joint-action effects, namely the joint Simon effect (or social Simon effect; Sebanz, 
Knoblich & Prinz, 2003). In the basic paradigm, co-actors sit adjacent to one 
another and each has a single target they are required to respond to. One 
participant responds with their left hand, the other with their right. For example, 
co-actor A may respond only to the appearance of a blue stimulus by pressing a 
left key, whereas co-actor B presses a right key whenever a green stimulus is 
displayed. Furthermore, targets can appear either to the left or right hand side of 
a display. Results indicate that although the position of the targets is irrelevant, 
co-actors are generally quicker to respond to stimuli appearing on the side 
associated with their response button (e.g., left key press for a blue stimulus 
appearing to the left) and are slower whenever their target appears on the 
partner’s side (Sebanz et al., 2003, Hommel, Colzato & van den Wildenberg, 
2009). Importantly, this effect is present only when the task is performed jointly 
with another individual, or alone where the person makes both responses (i.e., 
Simon & Rudell, 1967), but not when a lone participant responds to just one of the 
two stimuli (Hommel, 1996). In the terminology of TEC, the standard (lone) Simon 
effect occurs because agents automatically form binding codes between the 
relevant stimulus features (i.e., colour) and the irrelevant but corresponding 
stimulus features (i.e., location). Consequently, when these coincide a facilitation 
effect, translated into shorter reaction time (RT), occurs whereas a stimulus-
response mismatch results in interference and longer RTs (Hommel et al., 2001; 
Hommel et al., 2009). Following this logic, Sebanz and colleagues (2003, Sebanz, 
Bekkering & Knoblich, 2006) argued that when acting jointly on a task, co-actors 
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represent each other’s stimulus-response maps and therefore experience 
interference whenever these are violated. This suggests that co-actors represent 
and integrate each other’s perspective (Sebanz et al., 2003, 2006; Sebanz & 
Knoblich, 2009, Obhi & Sebanz, 2011).  
    Action representation mechanisms have also been invoked to explain 
another commonly employed joint action phenomenon first reported by Welsh and 
colleagues (Atkinson, Simpson, Skarratt  & Cole, 2014; Doneva & Cole, 2014; 
Cole, Skarratt, Billing, 2012; Hayes, Hansen & Elliott, 2010; Ondobaka, de Lange, 
Newman-Norlund, Wiemers & Bekkering, 2012; Ondobaka, Newman-Norlund, de 
Lange & Bekkering, 2013; Reid, Wong, Pratt, Morgan & Welsh, 2013; Skarratt, 
Cole & Kingstone, 2010; Skarratt, Cole & Kuhn, 2012; Welsh, Elliot, Anson, Dhillon, 
Weeks, et al., 2005; Welsh, Lyons, Weeks, Anson, Chua, et al., 2007; Welsh, 
McDougall & Weeks, 2009a; Welsh, Ray, Weeks, Dewey, Elliott, 2009b). In the 
basic paradigm two co-actors sit facing each other and take turns to respond to 
targets appearing on a flat display located between them. Once a response has 
been made, the actor is required to return their hand to a resting position in front 
of them (see Fig.1). Typical results reveal that RTs to initiate a response are longer 
when reaching to the same location as the co-actor’s previous response. Or to put 
it another way, RTs are shorter when reaching to a different location, usually the 
opposite side of the display. Although an abundance of work has now examined 
the various characteristics and properties of the effect, it is not yet clear why the 
phenomenon occurs. Indeed, authors, including ourselves, have assumed that the 
effect is due to a particular mechanism. This can be seen in the work of Welsh and 
colleagues and Skarratt et al. (2010) who, in referring to the effect as ‘between-
person inhibition of return’ and ‘social inhibition of return (sIOR)’ respectively, 
suggest it reflects the visuomotor inhibition that follows an attention-capturing 
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event. By contrast, Ondobaka et al. (2012, 2013) suggest the effect is due to 
congruency of observed and performed action, i.e., imitation. In the present paper, 
we describe and test three explanations that have been posited to explain the basic 
effect. We refer to the three explanations, described below, as the action-location 
account (Hayes et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2005, 2007, 2009 b), the movement 
congruency account (Ondobaka et al., 2012, 2013), and the attentional shift 
hypothesis (Cole et al., 2012). Although fundamentally different from each other, 
there are similarities amongst the three theories. For instance, both the Welsh et 
al.’s and Ondobaka et al.’s accounts incorporate the action-perception models 
described earlier in which an observed action is said to be represented both by 
perceptual mechanisms and action mechanisms. However, in contrast to Welsh et 
al.’s explanation, the location of response is not important in the Ondobaka et al.’s 
account. Furthermore, the theories of Welsh et al. and Cole et al. are both 
concerned with inhibitory mechanisms (i.e., IOR) whereas the Ondobaka et al.’s 
explanation is not.   
Welsh and collaborators (and others, e.g., Sebanz & Knoblich, 2009) argued 
that the effect is caused by the linking of mechanisms underlying action 
representation and inhibition. With respect to the former, Welsh et al. (2007, 
p.955) suggested ‘that ‘between-person IOR results from an understanding of the 
other person’s response’. Furthermore, Welsh et al. (2007) posited the mirror 
neuron system (MNS, Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004) as a mediating mechanism. 
The MNS is often referred to as the action observation system of the brain, known 
to become active both during action execution and when the same action is 
observed. As Welsh et al. (2007, p.955) stated, ‘We hypothesize that the activation 
of the mirror neuron system during the observation of the response mimicked the 
activity associated with the actual response’. The second and complimentary 
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aspect of their account concerns inhibition and specifically IOR. It is now well-
established that humans are slower to act upon a stimulus presented at a recently 
attended location (i.e., Posner & Cohen, 1984). Thus when an observer sees 
another individual attend to a location, this initiates IOR in the observer. Put 
simply, Welsh et al.’s account suggests that when co-actor A reaches to location 
X, actor B’s perceptual mechanisms perceive it as if co-actor B has performed the 
action themselves which activates an inhibitory response to that location.  
The second account, advocated by Ondobaka et al. (2012, 2013), places the 
effect within the context of mechanisms that represent congruency of movement. 
In addition to inhibiting an action, observing a biological movement can also 
facilitate the same movement in the observer. For example, participants are 
quicker to execute a finger (Brass, Bekkering  & Prinz, 2001) or an arm movement 
(Kilner, Paulignan & Blakemore, 2003) compatible with the one observed (Kilner 
et al., 2003, see also Liepelt, Cramon & Brass, 2008). With respect to the present 
phenomenon, Ondobaka et al. argued that when a participant reaches out to, say, 
their right (because the target appeared on the right) this facilitates a rightward 
reach in the observer (i.e., co-actor) when she is then required to reach to her 
right on the next trial. In other words, the action is facilitated when, within an 
egocentric framework, it is congruent with the one just seen.  
The third explanation argues that the effect occurs solely as a result of 
mechanisms associated with attentional orienting and resultant IOR (Cole et al., 
2012). The basic IOR phenomenon is normally studied in paradigms where a 
peripheral ‘cue’ is presented to a lone observer, followed by a delay longer than 
approximately 300 ms and a target that appears with equal probability at either 
the cued or the uncued location (Posner & Cohen, 1984; Posner, Rafal, Choate, & 
Vaughan, 1989). Results typically show that participants are slower to respond to 
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cued targets. In other words, after an initial capture of attention by the cue, 
inhibition follows. Thus, it is possible that instead of representing an observed 
action the effect occurs because a co-actor’s arm movement (and/or target onset) 
shifts the observer’s attention to one side of the display. In effect, the partner’s 
arm reach serves an identical role to the peripheral cue in Posner and Cohen’s 
classic study (1984); that is, it provides a transient event that draws an observer’s 
attention to a region of space. Furthermore, the fact that the phenomenon is still 
observed when only the initial portion of the arm movement can be seen (see 
Welsh et al., 2007 and Skarratt et al., 2010) does not negate the attentional shift 
hypothesis; occluding the peripheral ‘transients’ generated by a reaching action 
renders the initial (seen) movement as a ‘central’ cue, and classical IOR is now 
known to be induced with central cues (e.g., Cole, Smith & Atkinson, 2015; Taylor 
& Klein, 2000; Weger, Abrams, Law & Pratt, 2008). Indeed, Skarratt et al. (2010) 
reported that seeing a co-actor’s eye gaze only, was sufficient to generate social 
IOR (Skarratt et al., 2010)1. In support, a very recent study found that visual 
access to the partner’s targets seems to be necessary for social IOR to occur, as 
knowledge alone about the location of the partner’s response, communicated via 
the presentation of auditory cues (a low- or a high-toned pitch) could not trigger 
the effect (Welsh, Manzone & McDougall, 2014). Thus, Welsh et al. (2014) 
concluded that their results were indicative of the phenomenon being more likely 
to be modulated by the sensorimotor, lower-order aspects of the task, rather than 
higher-order aspects such as action goals. However, still they submitted that ‘the 
sIOR effect is dependent on the observers witnessing and representing the spatial 
                                                          
1 Debate surrounds the degree to which IOR is due to inhibition of attention as opposed to 
motor processes. However, most authors agree that an initial shift of attention occurs in 
order to induce IOR. 
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aspects of how the action was executed’ (p. 158). Thus, Welsh et al. (2014) 
advocate that the observation of action in particular plays a special role in 
triggering the effect. This interpretation of social IOR, however, still differs from 
the one of Cole et al. who propose that any salient event (not necessarily biological 
action) could lead to the generation of social IOR (Atkinson et al., 2014; Doneva 
& Cole, 2014).  
          The present work examined which of the three theories provides the most 
parsimonious explanation of the basic joint-action effect described above. In 
Experiment 1 we assess the consequences of having attention shifted to a location 
in the absence of an observed action to that location, i.e., in which no imitation or 
action representation can occur. In Experiment 2 we examine whether the time 
course of the effect concurs with what is known about the time course of action 
co-representation mechanisms. Experiment 3 assesses whether high-level 
attributions made to a co-actor can modulate the effect, as has been established 
for the joint Simon effect (e.g., Hommel et al., 2009).  
 
<Insert Fig.1 here> 
Fig. 1 A schematic representation of the ‘social IOR’ paradigm.  
 
Experiment 1 
         Recall that Welsh et al.’s (2005) account of the present joint action effect 
posits that co-actors inhibit actions via the MNS whilst Ondobaka et al. (2012) 
suggest that the effect is due to congruency of actions. Thus, action 
representations are central to both theories. By contrast, Cole et al. (2012) 
suggest that actions are epiphenomenal: in this context, they merely happen to 
shift attention. It follows therefore, that if the actions performed by a co-actor are 
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different to that of the participant, and furthermore, cannot be seen by the 
participant, then no imitation or action representation can occur. Therefore in one 
block of trials in Experiment 1, all actions performed by the participant’s 
(confederate) co-actor were occluded by a barrier (the ‘non-visible’ condition). In 
these trials the participant made a reaching response to a target (i.e., performed 
the standard task) whilst their co-actor operated a physical arrow that merely 
pointed to the target rather than reach to it. In a second block, both co-actors 
performed the standard task in which they both reached out to the target. Critically 
therefore, in the non-visible condition participant’s attention could be shifted to a 
target side without the co-actor having made a reaching response to it. The action 
accounts of Welsh et al. and Ondobaka et al. predict that the basic effect should 
be reduced, if not abolished, when actions cannot be seen. The Cole et al.’s account 
by contrast predicts that the effect should occur because the arrow and/or targets 
act as an attentional cue. 
Method 
 
Participants 
 A volunteer sample of 24 (6 male; 18 female) participants aged between 18 
and 25 took part in the study. All were undergraduates at the University of Essex, 
right-handed and naïve to the purposes of the study. Ethical approval from the 
ethics committee of the University of Essex was obtained prior to commencing of 
all three experiments.  
 
 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
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 In social IOR experiments co-actors invariably sit in slightly different 
positions with respect to each other, the workspace, and stimuli. Thus, stimuli size 
differs in terms of visual angle for each participant, we therefore provide all 
measurements in mm. Stimuli were presented on a 22” LCD monitor built into a 
table positioned between the co-actors and had a Keytec touch-screen placed over 
it. The participants sat across the table so that they were facing one another and 
the distance between their chests and their ‘home buttons’ was approximately 240 
mm. A black square measuring 10 mm in diameter (0.3 cd/m2 measured on-
screen) was presented in the centre of the display against a uniform white 
background (67.3 cd/m2) and acted as a fixation point. Two other squares of the 
same size and luminance were presented to the left and right of the display area 
(see Fig. 2). The target was the rapid onset then offset (i.e., a flash) of one of 
these squares. Participants made a response by moving their hand from the home 
button and touching the target square. One co-actor served as the naïve 
participant whilst the other was a confederate. On half of the trials a barrier was 
located such that it occluded all hand/arm movements made by the confederate 
co-actor. A wooden arrow was located at the base of this barrier operated by the 
co-actor. An RM Pentium PC running custom software controlled stimulus 
generation and the recording of responses.  
 
<Insert Fig.2 here> 
Fig. 2 The equipment used in Experiment 1. The confederate co-actor operates 
one end of the wooden arrow. No actions can be seen by the participant.  
 
 
 
 
 
Design  
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We employed a within-participants 2 x 2 design. The first factor manipulated 
target side, i.e., the side of the display where the target appeared compared with 
the previous trial. We refer to this factor as  ‘target side’ instead of ‘target location’ 
throughout the paper since although in Experiment 1 participants responded to 
exactly the same physical location, in Experiment 2 and 3 they responded to either 
the same or different side, rather than the exact physical location. A same trial 
was one in which the target occurred on the same side as the previous trial whilst 
a different trial was one in which that target appeared on the opposite side. The 
second factor manipulated the visibility of the co-actor’s action. This had two 
levels. Either the participant had a full view of the co-actor’s action or it was fully 
occluded. The dependent variable in all experiments was the time that elapsed 
between target presentation and the screen touch (response time, RT).  
Procedure 
 Participants were asked to alternate responses with their co-actor and that 
they should reach out and touch the target as soon as their target appeared and 
then return their hand to the ‘home’ button in front of them. The target appeared 
for 100 msec. Three hundred and fifty ms elapsed between response completion 
and the next target occurring. Participants were asked to fixate the centre until 
they were required to make their response, during which they were instructed to 
fixate the target. They were additionally told that they should respond as quickly 
and as accurately as possible. Furthermore, they were informed that other than to 
alternate responses, they should ignore their partner’s responses. In the visible 
condition the confederate co-actor performed the same task as the participant. 
That is, he reached out and touched the location of the target. In the non-visible 
condition by contrast, he moved one end of the wooden arrow such that it pointed 
directly at the target position. The co-actor then returned the arrow to the mid 
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position immediately after. He also remained fixated on the central point for the 
entire duration of the trial. A custom program generated a random sequence for 
the presentation of the targets where no target appeared on the same side more 
than four times in succession. The target side factor was presented randomly 
within-block whilst the visibility factor was blocked. Two blocks of trials were 
presented, each comprising 209 trials (104 participant trials together with 105 co-
actor trials).  
Results and Discussion 
 
Outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were removed from 
further analysis and accounted for 4.1% of responses. Fig. 3 shows mean RTs for 
the four conditions. An ANOVA with target side (same or different) and visibility 
(visible or non-visible) as within-participant factors revealed significant main 
effects of target side, F(1, 23) = 86.3, p < 0.001, 2
pη = .79, and visibility, F(1, 
23) = 17.7, p < 0.001,  2
pη = .44. The interaction was not however significant, 
F(1, 23) = 1.57, p > .22. Post-hoc analyses showed that the target side effect 
(i.e., social IOR) was present in both the visible and non-visible conditions, t(23) 
= 7.8, p < 0.001, and t(23) = 8.0, p < 0.001, respectively. 
 
<Insert Fig.3 here> 
Fig. 3 Mean RTs for Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean. 
 
The first notable aspect of these results is that participants were slower to 
initiate a response to the same target side that their co-actor had just reached to 
(in the visible condition). This replicates the basic social IOR findings of Welsh et 
al. (2005, 2007) and Skarratt et al. (2010). Important, however, was the 
14 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-015-0738-x 
observation that the effect also occurred in the non-visible condition in which no 
co-actor movements could be seen (and were different) but attentional cues were 
presented. These findings are clearly not in line with an account advocating a full 
reliance of the effect on action co-representation (Ondobaka et al.). Thus, the 
present phenomenon does not seem to stem from movement congruency effects 
where RTs are actually shorter when the observed and the required actions overlap 
(congruent condition) and longer in the incongruent condition as participants 
cannot inhibit the automatically-generated representation of the observed action 
(See Brass et al., 2000 for general information on the movement congruency 
effect). This is clearly not the case, as no actions could be observed in the non-
visible condition nevertheless, a significant social IOR occurred in this 
condition.Furthermore, the size of the effect was approximately the same in both 
visibility conditions. Overall, these data show that observing actions is not 
necessary for the effect to occur. Rather, we suggest that as long as attention is 
shifted to a target side IOR will occur in the observer, thus generating the effect. 
Experiment 2 
In order for action observation to effectively influence one’s own actions, the 
action representation ought to persist for some duration; time will elapse between 
the start of an observed action and the moment an observer performs a similar 
action themselves. Peak activity in motor areas following action observation has 
been reported to last between 2 s and 6 s (e.g., Lestou, Pollick & Kourtzi, 2008). 
Additionally, Gangitano, Mottaghy and Pascual-Leone (2004) found mirror neuron 
activation up to 3.2 s when participants observed videos of hand-grasping 
movements. Clearly, the use of relatively long delays between action observation 
and execution (e.g., 6 s in Gangitano et al., 2004; 3 s – 9 s in Gazzola, Rizzolatti, 
Wicker & Keysers, 2007) and resultant effects suggests that the MNS remains 
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active for a relatively long period after the inducing stimulus is no longer present. 
Moreover, mirror neurons have been implicated in delayed imitation performance 
(Krüger et al., 2014; Paukner, Ferrari & Suomi, 2011), in which imitation is 
prevented for a few seconds (Krüger et al., 2014) to several minutes (Rogers, 
Young, Cook, Giolzetti & Ozonoff, 2008) or even days (Meltzoff & Moore, 1994; 
Eskritt, Donald, & Muir, 1998). Furthermore, it has been found to correlate highly 
with immediate imitation both in terms of behavioural accuracy in humans 
(Rogers, Young, Cook, Giolzetti & Ozonoff, 2008) and rhesus monkeys (Paukner 
et al., 2011) and in terms of neural activation (Krüger et al., 2014).  
In contrast, previous studies examining the temporal characteristics of classic 
IOR have suggested that when the ‘traditional’ IOR procedure is employed, IOR 
has a limited time course. Thus, when uninformative, simple cues such as flashing 
lights are used, the inhibitory effect usually disappears when the cue-target 
interval (known as the stimulus onset asynchrony; SOA) is beyond 3000 ms (e.g., 
Castel et al., 2003, 2005; see Samuel & Kat, 2003 for a meta-analysis). As far as 
the social IOR effect is concerned, up to the author’s knowledge there has not been 
another study specifically examining how long the effect lasts. However, an 
overview of the literature on social IOR would suggest that the effect is generally 
considered a short-term one. For example, in an identical paradigm to the one 
used in the present Experiment 1, Skarratt et al. (2010) tested social IOR only in 
trials with short SOAs (1200ms – 1654 ms) since their first experiment 
demonstrated a lack of even classic IOR at a longer SOA (2400 ms). Moreover, 
other authors have also only tested the effect by using a short SOA design (e.g., 
1300ms–1700ms in Atkinson et al., 2014; 1000ms in Doneva & Cole; 1244–1620 
ms in Hayes et al., 2010; 1390–1663 ms in Welsh et al., 2005).  
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The aim of Experiment 2, therefore, was to systematically assess the time 
course of the present joint action effect. Therefore, in Experiment 2 we used four 
different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA); 1000 ms, 2200 ms, 3400 ms, and 
4600 ms. Based on the notion that action observation processes need to persist 
for some time while research on the time course of standard IOR has suggested 
that classic IOR is a short-term effect, again the different theories make different 
predictions about the time course of the present effect. Thus, while, Welsh et al.’s 
and Ondobaka et al.’s (action-based) accounts predict that the effect ought to be 
present in at least the two shortest SOA conditions, and probably in the longest 
two,  Cole et al.’s predict that it should disappear when a cue-target interval 
greater than 3000 ms is employed.  
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 A volunteer sample of 24 (2 male; 22 female) participants aged between 18 
and 22 took part. All were first-year psychology undergraduates at the University 
of Essex who participated in exchange for course credits. All were right-handed 
and were naïve to the purposes of the study. None had taken part in Experiment 
1. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
 All aspects of the stimuli were as described previously with the following 
exceptions. As with many other social IOR experiments two physical barriers were 
placed between co-actors that occlude peripheral transients. These allow a visible 
gap of 145 mm to be seen. Employing these barriers may be considered a 
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conservative way of assessing social IOR because the effect relies on action as a 
central cue.  
Because of these barriers, co-actors could not respond to the same targets. 
The targets (same dimensions as described in Experiment 1), were therefore 
grouped inside two light grey rectangles, each covering 200 mm2 of the screen. 
Thus, two squares (1 to the left, 1 to the right) were displayed in front of each 
participant. They were located at a distance of 160 mm from the black fixation 
cross and were protruding 50 mm to the left and to the right of the screen midline. 
The distance between the left and the right squares was 320 mm. As in Experiment 
1 target illumination represented a removal of one of the black squares for 100 
ms.    
 
 
Design and Procedure 
 The experiment had a 2 (target side) x 4 (SOA) fully within-participants 
design. In order to generate different SOAs we varied the interval between the 
completion of one response and the target onset of the following trial. That is, the 
inter-trial interval (ITI). These were 350 ms, 1550 ms, 2750 ms, and 3950 ms. 
Because the SOA includes the time it takes a participant to complete a response, 
the precise SOA values are not known. However, we know that the mean 
movement time to contact the target in the standard social IOR paradigm is 
approximately 325 ms. This, plus the time it takes to return the hand to the home 
button (325 ms) equates to a total of approximately 650 ms. By then adding the 
appropriate ITI, an approximate SOA is generated for each ITI. That is, the interval 
between seeing a co-actor’s hand beginning to move and the participant’s own 
target. The four SOA conditions were blocked and their presentation order was 
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counterbalanced. Each block consisted of 209 trials. This generated a total of 836 
trials. Participants undertook one practice session consisting of 21 trials which had 
the same SOA as the first experimental condition they completed. Unlike in 
Experiment 1, both co-actors were participants rather than one being a 
confederate. As in Experiment 1, the dependent variable was the time that elapsed 
between target presentation and the screen touch (response time, RT).  
Results and Discussion 
 
Outliers (more than two SDs above or below the mean) were removed from 
further analysis. Mean RTs (see Fig. 4) were computed as a function of target side 
(same, different) and SOA (1000 ms, 2200 ms, 3400 ms and 4600 ms) and were 
entered into a 2 x 4 fully-within participants ANOVA. The main effect of SOA was 
significant, F (3, 69) = 58.17, p < .001, 2
pη = .717, as was the main effect of 
target side, confirming the presence of social IOR, F (1, 23) = 7.91, p < .01, 2
pη
= .256. Importantly, the SOA x target side interaction was also significant, F (3, 
69) = 3.26, p < .027, 2
pη = .124, indicating that social IOR was modulated by 
SOA. Planned comparisons showed that social IOR occurred only when the SOA 
was 1000 ms, t (23) = 2.74, p < .012. In all other SOA conditions, the difference 
between the two target types was non-significant (all ps > .498).  
  Experiment 2 demonstrated that social IOR is modulated by the interval 
between action observation and action performance. Specifically, the effect is a 
short-lived phenomenon which extinguishes somewhere between 1000 ms and 
2200 ms. Although no other studies have systematically examined its duration, 
the present results support earlier findings using short trial and ITI durations 
(Atkinson et al., 2014; Doneva & Cole, 2014; Hayes et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 
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2005). Importantly, the time course of the effect does not concur with the known 
time course of many other action observation effects (e.g., 6000 ms in Gangitano 
et al., 2004). These results in turn suggest that the mechanisms giving rise to 
social IOR are unlikely to be concerned with action observation. It is also worth 
noting that our observed duration of social IOR and consequent conclusion that it 
rapidly dissipates is very conservative; the SOA factor manipulated the time 
between the onset of an observed response and the initiation of an action. 
However, one could also argue that the critical interval is the one between seeing 
an action being completed (rather than being started) and initiating the same 
action oneself. Conceiving the duration in this way leads to the conclusion that 
social IOR persists for an even shorter duration. That is, between 350 ms and 1550 
ms. In light with what is known about classic IOR, the present findings indeed 
seem to be more consistent with such an IOR-like time course. Moreover, despite 
previously demonstrated to last up to 3000 ms (Castel et al., 2003, 2005), classic 
IOR has also been found to be most stable in the interval between 300 ms and 
1600 ms (See Samuel & Kat, 2003 for a meta-analysis) which is similar to the one 
observed in the Experiment 2. 
 
<Insert Fig.4 here> 
 
Fig. 4 Mean RTs as a function of SOA and target side position with respect to a 
partner’s target. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
Experiment 3 
Up to now Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that the present effect is more 
likely to be due to visuomotor inhibition, rather than action representation. Thus, 
the final  Experiment 3  examined whether the effect is modulated by higher level 
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mechanisms that represent relations between co-actors. As discussed in the 
Introduction, the classic example of shared task representations has been the joint 
Simon effect. It is known that higher-order factors such as the personal 
relationship between co-actors affect the extent to which they represent the 
other’s task rules. For instance, Hommel et al. (2009) found that the joint Simon 
effect was present only when there was a positive relationship between the two 
partners and disappeared when participants were partnered with a negative 
confederate. Furthermore, a similar study indicated that the joint Simon effect was 
influenced by one’s mood (Kuhbandner, Pekrun & Maier, 2010) such that it was 
present when a positive mood had been induced in participants but disappeared if 
the task followed negative affect induction. Indeed, early social psychology 
research has indicated that individuals are less likely to integrate the perspective 
and ideas of a person they dislike (Heider, 1958) and that liking another person 
decreases the self-other distinction (Aron, Aron, Tudor & Nelson, 1991). In 
Experiment 3 therefore, we replicated the present joint action procedure under 
two different conditions: either the co-actor acted in a positive manner towards 
the participant or a negative manner. 
Method 
Participants  
A volunteer sample of 24 (9 male; 15 female) participants aged between 18 
and 28 (M = 20.38 years, SD = 3.87 years) took part in the study. All participants 
were undergraduates at the University of Essex who participated in exchange for 
£3. 
Stimuli and Apparatus 
 The stimuli and apparatus were as described previously in Experiment 2 
including the use of the physical barriers, placed between the two co-actors. 
21 
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-015-0738-x 
Design and Procedure 
 The experiment had a 2 (target side: same, different) x 2 (partner: positive, 
negative) mixed participants design. The dependent variable was again 
participants’  RT referring to the interval between target presentation and screen 
touch. 
Participants completed 2 blocks of 209 trials. All other aspects were as 
described previously. Half of the participants were confronted with an exceptionally 
nice confederate (positive condition) whereas the other half with a more distant 
and critical one (negative condition)2. The first author (SPD) acted as the 
confederate in both valence conditions. This began at the start of the experimental 
session, with the ‘positive’ confederate greeting the participant and initiating a 
friendly conversation, and smiling throughout the experiment. At the same points 
in the negative condition, the confederate was more distant, indifferent yet still 
polite. She also greeted the participant, yet did not smile at them, or initiate an 
informal conversation before the start of the experiment. Regardless of 
confederate type, a set of fixed phrases were used as feedback to the participant 
during the experiment. The confederate gave feedback to the participant on only 
two occasions – once they had completed the practice session and after the first 
experimental block. The wording of the phrases used in the positive and negative 
condition was very similar and the feedback was delivered only while the 
confederate was looking at the participant’s data. Thus, in the positive condition 
after the practice block, the confederate used the phrases: ‘You were very quick’ 
and ‘You didn’t make any mistakes’ and confirmed this after the first experiment 
                                                          
2 There is clearly an inherent difficulty in manipulating and operationalising (i.e., acting 
out) what is essentially a personality variable. We therefore based this aspect of our 
procedure on Hommel et al. (2009) who partly manipulated positive/negative interaction 
via a number of set phrases. 
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block by saying: ‘You were again very quick’ and ‘You didn’t make any mistakes’. 
By contrast, in the negative condition the confederate used: ‘I’m afraid you were 
not quick enough’ and ‘You made several mistakes’ and confirmed this with the 
statements: ‘You were still not very quick’ and ‘You again made some mistakes’ 
after the end of the first experimental block. Although it was not expected that the 
negative condition would cause emotional discomfort in participants, their 
emotional reactions were monitored, so that the experiment could be stopped 
immediately if any signs of distress were noticed. Based on Hommel et al. (2009), 
participants’ subjective feelings of happiness, anxiety, nervousness, irritation and 
insecurity were informally assessed.  Participants were also orally debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
 
As previously described, outliers (2SDs) were removed. The data were 
entered into a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with target side (same, different) as a within-
participants factor and partner type (positive, negative) as a between-participants 
factor (See Fig. 5). The main effect of target side was significant, (F (1, 22) = 
5.28, p < .031, 2
pη =.19), confirming the presence of social IOR. However, neither 
the effect of partner, nor the partner x target side interaction were significant (ps 
> 0.74). Still, to be more stringent, planned follow-up comparisons were 
performed to examine whether social IOR emerged in the two partner conditions. 
Interestingly, these revealed a significant effect in the negative partner condition 
(t (11) = 2.74, p < .02, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025) but not in the positive 
partner condition (t (11) = 0.41, p < .687, Bonferroni adjusted alpha = .025). 
These results suggest that unlike the joint Simon effect, social IOR is not 
influenced by higher-order factors such as the social affiliation between the two 
co-actors or the participant’s affect during the task. Indeed, statistically, the effect 
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was comparable in both partner conditions as the target location by partner type 
interaction did not reach significance. However, even a more conservative 
interpretation of the results (i.e., exploring the simple main effects) yields the 
opposite of what would be expected if action representation subserved the present 
effect – social IOR should have emerged in the positive, rather than the negative 
partner condition, as individuals are known to normally integrate the perspective 
of people they like (Heider, 1958; Hommel et al., 2009). Thus, these findings 
suggest that unlike the SSE, social IOR is not influenced by higher-order factors 
such as the social affiliation between the two co-actors or the participant’s affect 
during the task.  
Finally, the data revealed that type of partner did not significantly affect 
participants’ general response speed. This might have been due to both the 
positive and the negative condition producing comparable effects on general RT 
performance through different routes. Thus, while participants in the positive 
partner condition performed well because they presumably experienced increased 
levels of positive affect (Andersen & Chen, 2002), those in the negative condition 
probably wanted to improve their performance as they were receiving negative 
feedback (‘participants took the speed-related comments of the confederate to 
heart’, Hommel et al., 2009, p.797). In support, the tendency in general RTs was 
similar to that reported by Hommel et al. (2009) who found that individuals in the 
negative condition responded more quickly. 
Finally, we consider the present manipulation as successful since virtually all 
participants in the negative condition reported feelings of irritation in the post-
experimental interviews. In contrast, participants in the positive conditions 
reported feelings of happiness, security and satisfaction. 
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<Insert Fig.5 here> 
 
Fig. 5 Mean RTs to localise targets as a function of partner type and target side. 
Error bars represent standard errors of the mean. 
 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
 
When two individuals alternate reaching responses to targets located between 
them, responses are slower when they are directed to the same location as a co-
actor’s previous response. Three different theories have been posited to explain 
the effect, each of which differs in terms of how important action and attention are 
in generating the effect. The action-location account of Welsh and colleagues (e.g., 
Welsh et al. 2007) suggests that observers inhibit an action towards the location 
just responded to whilst the movement congruency account of Ondobaka et al. 
(2012; 2013) suggests that observers imitate the action just seen. These two 
explanations therefore posit action as being centrally or at least peripherally 
involved in mediating the effect. By contrast, the attentional shift hypothesis of 
Cole et al. (2012) suggests that the representation of an action per se is not 
necessary for the effect to occur. Rather, the body movement seen acts as an 
attention shifting cue, which then induces IOR. Experiment 1 showed that RTs are 
increased in the same-side condition (i.e., the basic effect still occurs) even when 
a co-actor performed a different action to that of the participant and one that could 
not be seen. Importantly however, the effect was observed when a participant’s 
attention was directed to a target side via attentional cues. The notion that social 
IOR is not due to action representation was supported in Experiment 2 where the 
duration of the effect was found to be substantially shorter than one that would be 
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expected of an action representation effect. Finally, Experiment 3 found that, 
unlike the joint Simon effect (see Hommel et al., 2009; Kuhbandner et al., 2010) 
the mechanisms that subserve social IOR do not represent the personal 
relationship between the co-actors. 
Overall these findings do not support an account of the basic phenomenon 
based on action representation. Rather, they suggest that the effect is due to IOR 
induced by an attentional shift. Specifically, when a co-actor reaches to a particular 
target side, this shifts an observer’s attention there (e.g., Cole & Kuhn, 2009; 
2010). Attention is then shifted away from this ‘cued’ position to where the co-
actor returns their hand. Visuomotor inhibition (i.e., IOR) is subsequently 
generated in the observer for the processing of stimuli that appear at the target 
side. In effect, an observed response acts in the same manner as any other visual 
cue that shifts attention and elicits IOR. As we set out in the Introduction, Welsh 
et al.’s account does include IOR as a part of the process that generates the basic 
effect. However, this is said to occur in conjunction with action observation 
mechanisms and the MNS. Thus, action is very much part of the Welsh et al.’s 
account. By contrast, the Cole et al.’s (2012) account suggests that the observed 
action only serves to shift attention. This is supported by other recent work. For 
instance, Doneva and Cole (2014) found that social IOR can be induced in response 
to attention-capturing transients that mimic the movement of an arm reach even 
when there is no co-actor actually present (see also Welsh et al., 2007). The 
authors also found the basic effect when a participant’s co-actor used her leg/foot 
to reach to the target side rather than her arm/hand. As with the present 
Experiment 1, no imitation was permitted in these scenarios.  
A more conservative assessment of the present results however, suggests 
that although the imitation account has been refuted, the action-location account 
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of Welsh et al. could still be occurring. Welsh et al. (2005) argued that the distal 
cause of the basic phenomenon could be due to the same reasons that basic (i.e., 
lone) IOR is sometimes thought to occur. Klein and MacInnes (1999) suggested 
that IOR is a visual search facilitator that assists in foraging; it is uneconomical to 
return to a location or object just viewed. Since humans have evolved as social 
animals, Welsh et al. suggested that IOR might occur for locations where another 
individual has just searched. Thus simply knowing that another individual has 
attended to a location, even when they have not reached or acted on it may be 
enough to induce social IOR. This is precisely the scenario we had in the non-
visible condition of Experiment 1; social IOR was observed when the co-actor 
pointed, and therefore attended to a location, without actually reaching or acting 
upon it. However, it should be noted that Welsh et al. (2014) recently argued that 
receiving auditory information alone about where the partner was going to respond 
(without seeing the person reaching) was not sufficient to activate the inhibitory 
mechanisms giving rise to IOR. Thus, the authors concluded that ‘some 
visuospatial information about the co-actor's action is necessary to activate the 
processes leading to sIOR’ (Welsh et al., 2014, p. 157). Still, other published 
studies suggest that the observation of the partner’s reaching is not necessary to 
produce social IOR (Atkinson et al., 2014; Doneva & Cole, 2014). Thus, in our view 
attention to a location could be considered as the critical component of the Welsh 
et al.’s account rather than the action component. 
However, still, not all aspects of the present interpretation of the findings 
agree with previous research on social IOR. More specifically, there was an 
important methodological difference between early research on social IOR and the 
present Experiment 1. As mentioned earlier, in the visible condition of Experiment 
1, participants had a full view of their partner’s targets and actions. In contrast, 
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Welsh et al. (2005, 2007) and Skarratt et al. (2010) prevented the co-actors from 
seeing the onset of the partner’s target by either making each co-actor wear a pair 
of translucent goggles or by placing a partial physical barrier between the two co-
actors (as in the present Experiments 2 & 3). This proposition was based on the 
idea that when participants could fully see their partner’s target flash and arm 
movement, this would inevitably generate classic IOR, as IOR is activated in a 
response to sensory stimulation. Thus,  Skarratt et al. (2010) submitted that ‘IOR 
is not usually obtained […] under impoverished viewing conditions’ and ‘the 
strictest test of socially-induced IOR, then, would be its emergence in a task 
performed in conjunction with a real, rather than animated, partner and under 
impoverished viewing conditions’ (p. 49). However, it seems that this early 
interpretation of the effect excludes any necessity to test the socialness of the 
effect, as it assumes that social IOR is intrinsically social and that it is triggered by 
different factors as compared to basic IOR. Moreover, it seems that the mentioned 
above ‘strictest test’ of social IOR is simply based on one of the possible 
explanations of why the effect occurs but does not necessarily represent a robust 
measure of the social IOR effect. Indeed, Skarratt et al.’s (2010) interpretation is 
more in line with the action-location hypothesis submitted by Welsh et al. than 
Cole et al.’s attentional shift hypothesis (e.g., ‘any resulting inhibition must instead 
be generated through inference of a real person’s response behaviour’, Skarratt et 
al., 2010).  However, some later work has challenged this early explanation of the 
effect involving the MNS by demonstrating that social IOR is not modulated by 
action goals (e.g., Cole et al., 2012). Moreover, in several similar social IOR studies 
where participants alternated responses with a biological typically-developing co-
actor, no difference in the magnitude of the effect has been reported as a function 
of viewing condition (Skarratt et al., 2010; Hayes et al., 2010; Welsh et al., 2005, 
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2009 a, b). Furthermore, in the majority of recent papers the effect emerging in 
the social IOR paradigm under full viewing conditions (where the RT of one co-
actor is examined as a function of the responses made by another co-actor/event) 
is interpreted as indicative of social IOR (e.g., Atkinson et al., 2014; Cole et al., 
2012; Doneva & Cole, 2014; Reid et al., 2013). Finally, there is evidence that the 
proposition that ‘IOR is not usually obtained […] under impoverished viewing 
conditions’ (Skarratt et al., 2010, p.49) is not necessarily universal. For instance, 
in their last experiment, instead of a co-actor, Welsh et al. (2007) introduced a 
moving rectangle, mimicking hand movements while at the same time restricting 
participants’ vision and even preventing auditory cues as white noise masked any 
response-related noise. In discrepancy with Skarratt et al.’s (2010) proposition, 
despite the lack of any visual or auditory cues, a significant within-participants IOR 
effect emerged. Taken together, in unison with Cole et al.’s attentional shift 
hypothesis, in our view, a more accurate measure of the social IOR effect is the 
difference in RT of co-actor A as a function of whether they repeated or not the 
location of co-actor B, regardless of viewing condition. Moreover, the latter 
reasoning also invites a discussion onto whether ‘social IOR’ is the most 
appropriate term for the effect and what other terms could be more suitable. One 
option is substituting the term ‘social’ for ‘joint’, similarly to Dolk et al. who refer 
to the SSE as the Joint Simon effect, or sticking to the originally proposed between-
person IOR, as suggested by Welsh et al. (2005).The present findings also raise 
the possibility that previous work has underestimated the role that attentional 
orienting plays in joint action phenomena. This issue has thus far received little 
consideration. Indeed, it is common for action observation and joint-action studies 
to make no reference to attentional orienting, or ‘attention’ at all, (e.g., Atmaca, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2008; Braun, Ortega, & Wolpert, 2011; Paulus & Moore, 2007; 
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Vesper, van der Wel, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011), including articles that review the 
field (e.g., Galantucci & Sebanz, 2009). One exception was reported by Dolk, 
Hommel, Prinz and Liepelt (2013). They showed that the joint Simon effect can 
occur even in the absence of a partner as long as a sufficiently salient event shifts 
attention to where the partner would normally respond. Although this shift was 
believed to initiate a different process to the one proposed for the present 
paradigm, i.e., a spatial coding of event features as opposed to IOR, attentional 
orienting is central to Dolk et al.’s explanation. Indeed, Dolk, Hommel, Colzato, 
Schütz-Bosbach, Prinz and Liepelt (2014) have gone on to suggest that ‘neither 
the integration of another person nor the integration of another person’s action 
into one’s own action, task, or body representation is necessary for the [Joint 
Simon Effect] to occur’ (p.5). This is however, not to say that models advocating 
shared action representations exclude attentional processes initiated by an action 
performed by another individual. Nor do attentional models rule out the possibility 
that attentional attraction leads to co-representation. For instance, attention, 
along with perception and intention, is very much part of the TEC (Hommel et al., 
2001). The issue however is whether action representation is required at all for 
some joint action effects. It does appear that it is not necessary for two such 
effects to occur, i.e., the joint Simon effect, and social IOR.  
Furthermore, we are not suggesting that attention plays a role in, and/or 
explains all action observation effects. A number of studies have shown such 
effects when attentional orienting has been controlled. For instance, Liepelt et al. 
(2008) presented photographs of a hand that had a target number placed over the 
image. Observers were required to discriminate the target and make a response 
by lifting either their index or middle finger. The important manipulation was that 
the hand in the photograph had either its index or middle finger raised. Results 
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showed that when the target required the middle finger to be raised responses 
were faster if the depicted hand also had the middle finger raised. The same 
facilitation effect occurred for the index finger. Importantly, the authors undertook 
a control experiment showing that the effect was significantly reduced when the 
agent’s fingers were moved via small pulleys and wires (in order to examine 
intention to act). This eliminates attention as an explanation because the visual 
transients in both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ conditions were virtually identical. 
In sum, we have found that a common joint action effect purported to be due 
to the representation of an observed action can be induced when no actions are 
seen. We have also found that its time course is too short to be due to action 
representation mechanisms. We argue that as long as attention is shifted to the 
relevant location the effect will occur. This in turn suggests that the effect is 
attentional, being induced via IOR, rather than being due to action representation. 
Finally, given that the effect is likely to be due to relatively ‘lower’ mechanisms, 
we suggest that, in line with Dolk et al. (2013) and their reference to the ‘joint 
Simon effect’, the term ‘social IOR’ should be replaced with ‘joint IOR’, or even 
‘between-person IOR’ as Welsh et al. (2005) originally stated. 
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